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11. Introduction.
Many agency relationships have features of a natural monopoly. That is,
increasing returns to scale or indivisibilities require that the principal
entrust a given task to a single agent (firm, manager, worker, or team
thereof). Examples include the regulation of the electric utility, railroad
and cable TV industries. In military procurement a single source is most
frequent. And, in the realm of internal organization, jobs (such .as the chief
executive position) are often assigned to a single employee.
How should the agent (cable TV franchisee, defense contractor, CEO) be
selected to perform the task (supply cable services, build a new jet, run the
firm)? The economist's natural answer to this question is the auctioning of
the agency position. After accounting for the observable differences in
quality among the various bidders, the principal (regulator, department of
defense, shareholders) should choose the agent who minimizes agency costs or
creates the maximum value. In particular, in the regulatory context, Demsetz
[1968] has forcefully argued in favor of franchise bidding and his view has
been endorsed by Posner [1972] and Stigler [1968).
However, guaranteeing the winner a long-run monopoly position may not be
optimal. The arrival of new trading opportunities or the franchisor's
inadequate performance may make agent switching desirable. Instances of agent
switching abound. In the context of regulation or procurement, the regulator
sometimes turns to (breaks out for) a second source. In the context of
internal organization, the employment of a CEO can be terminated by the board
of directors (turnover), or, more frequently, by a raider (hostile takeover).
And employee switching results from the demotion, promotion or firing of the
employee. That is, a natural monopoly situation at each point of time need
2not result in intertemporal natural monopoly.
A simple way of assigning the task to the best agent at each point of
time is to repeat the auctioning process over time. However, Williamson in
his 1976 study of cable TV franchising has warned us against an excessive
resort to repeated franchise bidding. Minimizing short-run agency costs at
each point of time may not 'minimize long-run agency costs, because the absence
of commitment to a long-term relationship may impair the franchisee(s)'
incentives to invest in relationship-specific capital.
Two of Williamson's observations, both relative to investment, are of
particular interest for this paper. First, some of the incumbent's
investments in human or non-tangible capital may not be transferable to a
second-source (some forms of such capital may be transferable: the
incumbent's personnel can be hired by the second source; also, the principal
may possess property rights on technological data, as is sometimes the case in
military procurement, so that he may be able to transfer the technology to a
second source at a low cost). With non-transferable investment, the incumbent
is likely to be more efficient than its rivals at the reprocurement stage.
Incumbency advantages do not imply that there is anything wrong with anonymous
auctions, simply that entrants are unlikely to win. Non-transferable
investments shield the incumbent from entry. This suggests that the study of
second-sourcing is of more interest under transferable than non-transferable
investment. Second, when investment is transferable, it is hard to determine
the right transfer price to be paid by the second-source to the incumbent
supplier. Both the monetary cost and the quality of investment are subject to
controversy. One might believe that the investment cost can readily be read
from accounting data. However, records can be manipulated and depreciation
charges distorted. Furthermore, the incumbent can integrate into the
3production of capital goods or else arrange kickbacks from his own suppliers
(who can inflate the price of capital goods, and pay the incumbent back
through side contracts). It is also difficult to measure the quality of
investment. How can the outside parties know how much time and energy the
incumbent managers have spent picking the appropriate technology? For these
two reasons, it is clear that the incumbent is unlikely to recover the full
value of his investment in case of second sourcing. [An alternative method of
encouraging the incumbent to invest is to give him -- and force him to keep
over the payback period of investment -- substantial stock options in the
second-source in case of breakout. Laffont and Tirole [1987a] argue in detail
that such stock options are at most a limited instrument both on theoretical
grounds and as a practical matter.]
These two observations form the building blocks for our analysis of
repeated auctioning and bidding parity. We analyze both transferable and
non-transferable investments, with an emphasis on the transferable ones. And
we will assume that investment is not perfectly observable; that is, the
principal is unable to recover the investment undertaken by the agent from the
observation of the aggregate accounting data (cost or profit), which also
reflects other imperfectly observable variables such as the environment (the
state of demand or of technology, the agent's ability), the agent's effort to
reduce cost or increase profit, and possibly accounting errors. [To simplify
the analysis while keeping the flavor of the argument, all variables labelled
"imperfectly observable" will be assumed utterly "unobservable"].
The goal of our research is to develop a model that reflects Williamson's
concerns and sheds light on his debate with the Chicago School (Demsetz,
Posner and Stigler). First, we analyze the desirability of second sourcing
when investment matters. Should bidding be biased at the reprocurement stage?
4If so, should the principal favor the second source or encourage the
persistence of monopoly? Second, if investment is of concern, how can the
principal encourage an adequate level? We will view managerial contracts as a
package of performance-related incentives and switching incentives.
Performanc.-related incentives include cost-sharing rules (in a procurement or
regulatory context) and stock or stock options (in an internal organization
context). Switching incentives directly bias the auctioning process. On the
incumbent side, cancellation fees (or golden parachutes) make the incumbent
less eager to resist second-sourcing. Similarly an entry fee (or, in the
context of takeovers, poison pills) make a second source less eager to replace
the incumbent. We will show that both performance-related incentives and
switching incentives must be structured in a simply way so as to obtain
appropriate incentives to invest. Third, we obtain clear and testable
relationships between the incumbent's performance, the probability of second
sourcing, performance-related incentives, and switching incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the main incentive
tradeoffs in a static (and therefore investment-free) context. Section 3
takes a dynamic perspective and introduces the possibility of second sourcing.
Assuming that investment is transferable to the second source, it derives the
normative recommendations and testable implications mentioned earlier.
Section 4 discusses how the theory might be applied or tested in specific
instances. For reasons developed there, it emphasizes the takeover
interpretation. Section 5 discusses extensions of the model to
non-transferable as well as to non-monetary investment.
52. Basic incentive trade-offs in the absence of agent switching.
This section assumes that the principal bargains with a single agent to
perform a given, single-period task. The agent will be interpreted as the
manager of a firm regulated or owned by the principal. Ex-post, the principal
can observe the agent's performance, which is taken to be realized cost C (in
the takeover application of the theory, this aggregate accounting data is
profit or stock value). A typical contract in such a situation has the
principal reward the agent as a linear function of his performance. After
payment of the cost by the principal (this is but an accounting convention),
the agent is paid a fixed fee F and then bears a fraction K of "cost
overruns." Mathematically, the net transfer t to the agent is given by the
equation:
(1) t = F-K(C-Ca)
where Ca is the anticipated (expected) cost and C-Ca denotes the cost overrun
(or underrun). The fraction K of cost born by the agent generally lies
between 0 and 1.
Similarly, if the relevant accounting data is profit or stock value, the
agent is rewarded according to
(1') t = F+K(n-na),
where F is a fixed wage and n-na is the difference between the firm's profit
and the anticipated profit, or else the increase in the firm's stock value
(possibly adjusted for dividends).
Two polar cases are of particular interest:
6* Cost-plus contract (K=O): The agent is not responsible for any cost
overrun or increase in profit.
* Fixed-price contract (K=I): The agent is made residual claimant for his
performance.
More generally, an incentive contract will denote a contract linear in
the agent's performance, with a coefficient of proportionality K in [0,1].
Economists have identified two basic issues in principal-agent
relationships: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection refers
to the possibility that the agent has private information about his
environment (the technology of production or the state of demand) or about his
own ability to run the firm. In the jargon of agency theory, a good manager
is a manager who knows that the cost is naturally low or the profit naturally
high. Because such a manager can always pretend to be or mimic a bad
manager's performance, he necessarily enjoys an informational rent in the
agency relationship. Moral hazard stems from the principal's inability to
monitor managerial effort. Effort unobservability implies that the manager
may not be trusted to supply the adequate level of effort to reduce cost or
boost profit.
Extracting the agent's rent and inducing an adequate level of effort are
two conflicting tasks of incentive design. Adverse selection is best tackled
by a cost-plus contract, which makes the principal the residual claimant for
variations in performance. That is, a good manager does not enjoy a rent, as
he does not appropriate any of the benefits associated with his superior
ability or the firm's superior technology. In contrast, a fixed-price
contract leaves full rent to the agent. Any exogenous cost reduction of cost
by $1 increases the agen's reward by $1.
7Cost-plus contracts, however, have perverse incentive effects. Because
the agent does not bear any cost increase, he has no incentive to reduce cost
and therefore shirks. In contrast, a fixed-price contract mades the agent the
residual claimant for his cost savings, and therefore induces him to exert the
socially optimal level of effort.
We thus see that increasing K both raises incentives for cost reduction
(alleviates the moral hazard problem) and increases the agent's rent
associated with private information (aggravates the adverse selection
problem). It is therefore unsurprising that optimal contracts trade these two
effects off and pick K between 0 and 1.
Because the agent has several potential "types" or "states of
information" (understand: his private information about his ability or the
firm's technology can take several values), a single incentive contract is
generally inappropriate. The contract must be tailored to the agent's type.
This implies that the principal must offer a menu of contracts, in which the
agent selects the most appropriate one given his information. This raises two
questions. First, when are optimal contracts indeed simple incentive
contracts? Second, what are the practical characteristics of these contracts?
Optimal contracts are generally fairly complex. However, it can be shown
that if the two parties are risk-neutral, and under some (reasonable)
conditions, the optimal policy for the principal is indeed to offer a menu of
incentive contracts (Laffont-Tirole [1986]).
Risk neutrality is of course a very strong assumption, as we would expect
managers to exhibit at least some risk aversion. The above result on the
optimality of linear contracts under risk neutrality suggests two comments.
First, there is little cost to using incentive contracts when the agent is not
very risk averse. Second, linear contracts may no longer be adequate for
8large risk aversion. However, (i) their simplicity, (ii) their pervasive use
in real agency situations, and (iii) the absence of clear positive results
for more general contracts in the theoretical literature still make them an
interesting subject of analysis. It can be shown that the characterization of
optimal incentive contracts obtained in the risk neutral case (see Fact 1
below) extends to the risk averse case (Laffont-Tirole [1986] and especially
Baron-Besanko [1988]). The only difference is a quantitative one. Risk
aversion drives the contracts toward the cost-plus contract (i.e., induces
lower values of K). From now on, we will assume risk neutrality.
Second, the fixed fee and the fraction of cost sharing in (1) must depend
on the level of announced (anticipated) cost. Otherwise, the agent would
inflate Ca without bound to increase his reward. Suppose we build the
incentive scheme so that it is in the agent's interest to announce truthfully
his expected cost (it can be shown that this requirement imposes no extra cost
on the principal). Note that the agent's expected reward is then equal to
fixed fee F in (1). The following two observations suggest how F and K should
vary with C a . Both make use of the fact that a good manager ends up with (and
therefore announces) a lower expected cost than a bad manager (this property
is easily demonstrated). First, steeper incentives are more attractive o a
more efficient agent, so that a good agent always chooses an incentive
contract with a higher slope than does a bad agent. This implies that, in the
menu of incentive schemes, the slope K must be negatively related to the
announced cost. A confident manager (who announces a low cost) should bear a
high fraction of cost overruns. A by-product of this is that a good agent has
more incentives to exert effort than a bad agent does. Second, the fixed fee
F must also be negatively related to the announced cost. Suppose not. This
would imply that a good agent gets less from the agency relationship than a
9bad one, as he works harder and obtains a lower expected reward. But a good
manager can always duplicate the bad manager's cost, and therefore reward, by
exerting less effort than the bad manager, which means that the good manager's
rent is necessarily higher, a contradiction. The fact that both F and K are
decreasing functions of Ca leads to our first testable implication:
Fact 1: In the menu of incentive contracts to be (optimally) offered by the
principal, the agent's expected reward and the slope of the
incentive scheme are positively related.
Remark on auctions: We assumed a single potential agent. The above
reasoning, and in particular Fact 1, can be extended to the case in which the
task is auctioned off among several agents, due to a simple dichotomy
property. It can be shown that everything is as if the winner of the auction
had been facing no competition, but the uncertainty about his type had been
reduced by the auctioning process. More precisely, the winner's most
inefficient potential type is not taken to be the upper bound on the
principal's prior distribution over his inefficiency, but the second bidder
(best loser)'s type. [Technically, competition amounts to an upward
truncation of the principal's prior probability distribution over the winner's
type.] Except for the fact that the winner's informational rent is reduced by
the existence of competition, the qualitative insights obtained for the
absence of competition thus carry over to the auctioning case (Laffont-Tirole
[1987b], McAfee-McMillan [1987]) (a related dichotomy property is obtained in
a different auctioning context by Riordan and Sappington [1987]).
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3. Second sourcing.
First consider the two-period version of the single firm model of section
2 and introduce investment. The firm has cost
C1 = 
3
-e +I+ 1 in period 1,
and
C2 = .- e2-g(I)+r 2 in period 2.
C t is the period-t aggregate cost (accounting data) for t = 1,2, and is
commonly observable. All other variables are assumed unobservable by the
principal. The variable 3 is a measure of the agent's ability and is known to
the agent only ( is the adverse selection parameter of section 2). A low 
corresponds to a good agent. The variable et represents the agent's effort to
reduce cost in period t (it is the moral hazard variable of section 2).
Exerting effort imposes a non-monetary cost or disutility of effort on the
agent, which does not enter the firm's accounts (Ct). The agent commits a
monetary investment I in the first period, which reduces the second-period
cost by g(I), where g(') is an increasing function. Last, the period-t cost
may be affected by an exogenous zero-mean random variable t, which stands for
forecast and accounting errors.
Remark on non-monetary investment. Recall from the introduction that
investment may be unobserved by the principal for two reasons. First it may
be monetary, but the number of dollars spent on it may be distorted through
accounting manipulations. Second, it may be non-monetary (a quality
parameter) and therefore hard to observe. Our model admits both
interpretations. The above formalization directly depicts the case of a
monetary investment. But a change of variables yields the quality
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interpretation as well. For, suppose that in the first period, the monetary
investment is fixed (zero, say), and that the agent exerts effort e to reduce
first-period cost (so that C1 = 3-e+c 1) and e to choose the "right
investment." The second-period cost reduction equals a constant plus g(e).
Assuming that the manager's first-period disutility of effort depends on total
first-period effort e+e, a relabeling of variables e1 - e+e and I e makes
the non-monetary investment formally equivalent to a monetary one.
Let 6 denote the discount factor between the two periods ( is equal to
one over one plus the rate of interest). The socially optimal investment
maximizes the difference between the cost reduction and the investment:
Max {6g(I)-I1.
I
But the actual level of investment is picked by the agent, so that it may
a priori differ from the socially optimal one. However, we know from Baron
and Besanko [1984] that the optimal incentive scheme is generally time
invariant. In our context, this implies that the slope Kt of the incentive
scheme is the same in both periods, and coincides with the single-period one.
That is, for any efficiency parameter 3,
K = K 2 = K.
But, this time invariance of the slope of the incentive scheme implies
convergence of the principal's and agent's interests as far as investment is
concerned (even though their interests diverge as to the choice of efforts,
because K is lower than 1). This can be easily seen from the agent's optimal
choice of investment:
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Max I6K2g(I)-K 1II = K max {6g(I)-II.
I I
Second, the impossibility of monitoring the agent's investment becomes a
problem once the possibility of second sourcing is introduced. Suppose now
that a potential second source (an entrant, a raider) comes in at the
beginning of period , that can produce at cost
C' = 3'-e'+g(I)+'
if it is chosen to produce in period 2. The second source is identical to the
incumbent in all respects but his efficiency (.3' can differ from .3). In
particular, we make the assumption that the incumbent's investment is
transferred to the second source (it is also assumed that ' is a zero-mean
random variable, and that the function of disutility of effort is the same for
both managers).
An omniscient principal would select the second source if and only if the
latter is more efficient than the incumbent (' < .3). So would an auction
between the two potential agents in the second period.
However, it is easily seen that the previous incentive scheme with time-
invariant slope) leads to underinvestment. In the first period, the incumbent
chooses I so as to
(2) Max f6K2g(I)p - K1I},
I
where p (in [0,1]) is the probability that second sourcing does not occur (the
probability refers to the fact that the incumbent does not know 3' when
choosing investment). From (2), a constant slope (K1 = K2 = K) induces a
suboptimal investment unless second sourcing is banned (p = 1).
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In general, second sourcing is desirable, as the second source may be
more efficient than the incumbent. The investment problem can then be
analyzed in terms of a straightforward externality. In a sense, the incumbent
captures only a fraction p of his investment. With probability 1-p, the cost
reduction is enjoyed without compensation by the second source. The
performance-related and switching incentives must optimally be designed so as
to make the incumbent internalize some of this positive externality (invest
more). The way to do so is apparent in (2):
· Performance-related incentives: By lowering K1 below K (the static
slope), the incumbent is given more incentives to invest, as he bears a lower
fraction of first-period cost. In contrast, raising K2 above K allows him to
cash in a higher fraction of the proceeds of his investment. The
intertemporal structure of incentives should thus be tilted toward
time-increasing incentives:
Fact 2: The slope of the incumbent's incentive scheme should grow over time
(in the event that second sourcing does not occur).
Obviously, such a policy has its limits. Moving K1 toward 0 (the
cost-plus contract) destroys incentives to reduce the first-period cost.
Similarly, raising K2 toward 1 (the fixed-price contract) increases the rent
enjoyed by the incumbent.
* Switching incentives: A complementary way of encouraging investment is
to raise the probability p that the incumbent's contract is renewed in period
2. This yields:
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Fact 3: The incumbent should be favored at the reprocurement stage (that is,
the principal may keep the incumbent even when the second source is
more efficient).
Thus, the second source's inefficiency parameter ' must be much lower
(and not simply lower) than the incumbent's 3 for second sourcing to occur.
Two other useful facts can be obtained along these lines. We saw that
the scale of the externality is proportional to the probability of second
sourcing. An incumbent with a high probability of being replaced internalizes
a lower fraction of his cost reduction. This implies that his investment must
be encouraged ore when the probability of second sourcing is high:
Fact 4: The slope of the incumbent's incentive scheme grows more over time,
the higher the ex-ante probability of second sourcing.
Fact 5: The incumbent should be favored more at the reprocurement stage, the
higher the ex-ante probability of second sourcing.
Fact 5 has straightfor~ward consequences for the real-world design of
switching incentives. To raise the probability that the incumbent's contract
is renewed, the principal can give a low cancellation fee (golden parachute in
the takeover interpretation) to the incumbent, making him less eager to be
replaced ex-post. And he can impose an entry fee (poison pills in the
takeover context) so as to make the second source less eager to replace the
incumbent.
Last, recall from section 2 that a good manager (low 3) (1) bears a
higher fraction of cost or profit (Fact 1) and (2) reaches a better
performance (lower cost, higher profit) than a bad manager (high 3).
ComZbining these facts ith Facts 2 through 5, we can use variations n
15
managerial ability (3) to trace some interesting statistical relationships (we
give both the procurement and takeover interpretations here):
Fact 6: The following variables are positively correlated:
- the firm's performance (low cost; high profit)
- the slopes of the incumbent's incentive scheme (fraction of cost
sharing; level of stock or stock options)
- the cancellation fee (golden parachute)
They are negatively correlated with:
- the probability of second sourcing (takeover)
- the entry fee (poison pills)
- the intertemporal increase in the slope of the incumbent's
incentive scheme.
Fact 6 yields a rich set of normative recommendations and testable
implications. For a more rigorous derivation of these facts and a proof that
optimal contracts are indeed linear, see Laffont-Tirole [1987a].
4. Empirical implications.
The model is general enough to encompass a wide variety of agency
relationships. Our original motivation when starting this research was to
analyze second sourcing in regulated industries. Second sourcing is actually
fairly infrequent in such industries. For instance, of the over 3,000
refranchising decisions made by cities on cable TV franchises as of late 1986,
few have involved serious competition and only five cities have expelled an
incumbent operator (Zupan [1987]). Similarly, breakouts in defense
contracting occur, but are still relatively unlikely. Of course, this may be
consistent with the generally pessimistic view of this paper concerning agent
switching: Agent switching is unlikely to be feasible if the incumbent
commits large non-transferable investments. On the other hand, when
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investment is transferable, the reprocurement process must be rigged against
the second source, and this all the more that the breakout is likely, as we
saw in section 3.
An application in which agent switching does occur frequently is the
market for corporate control (for instance, of the 454 firms in the Mork et.
al [1987] sample, 66 had been acquired by third parties during the period
1981-1985. To this number must be added turnovers by the board of directors
not motivated by retirement or (voluntary) resignation). Several reasons for
this may be offered. First, although investments may be sizeable, most of
them are likely to be transferable to the new managerial team (although we do
not deny that some human capital is lost in the process of replacing the CEO
and some of his close collaborators. Second, adverse selection may play a
non-negligible role in the firm's performance, as emphasized by Jensen and
Murphy [1987]. Managers with fresh ideas or simply superior ability may make
quite a difference, judging from the average 40 to 50% takeover premia. [Of
course, there are other explanations for these high premia. Some of the gains
may stem from simple transfers from stakeholders to shareholders
(Shleifer-Summers [19S7]). There may also exist synergy and tax gains. But
there is little doubt that the managers' general ability and ideas on ho to
run the firm in question play a major in takeover contests.]
The market for corporate control thus provides an interesting area for
testing the statistical relationships summarized in Fact 6. Before mentioning
a few studies that examine such correlations, we ought to make the point that
the empirical results are not direct tests of the above structural theory.
Rather, we consider them to be encouraging signs that our theory is not off
the mark. Furthermore, the theoretical variables are gross
oversimplifications of the real-w7orld strategic choices. For instance,
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Walking and Long [1984)'s managerial resistance variable is an indicator
variable set equal to 1 if the target management resists the offer, 0
otherwise. Obviously, resistance depends on the level of the offer
(influenced, e.g., by poison pills), the managerial golden parachute, the
structure of voting rights (existence of super-majority provisions, of
staggered board elections and of dual class recapitalizations), and the
possibility of post-offer takeover defenses (standstill agreements,
litigation, greenmail, etc.). Identifying resistance with the levels of
golden parachutes and poison pills as we do below grossly reduces the set of
relevant variables.
Also, we should reemphasize that the relationships in Fact 6 are not
causal. They are best interpreted as correlations between jointly determined
variables. For instance, an empirical result such as "managers with higher
stock options perform better on average" should not be interpreted as causal,
as tempting as it may be. [For one thing, if high stock options induce better
performance, why don't the managers with low stock options buy more stock
options to reach the level of other managers? The differences must be
explained over the sample. Our theory is that good m;anagers self-select and
choose contracts (or go to firms) with large stock options.]
:ork et. al [l988] show that there is a positive relationship between
managerial ownership and Tobin's q (taken to be a measure of the firm's
performance) when ownership does not exceed 5%. [The relationship becomes
less clear beyond 5%; so does the theory, as high ownership levels may confer
significant voting power on management.] They also show that Tobin's q is
negatively correlated with the probability of a takeover. Walking and Long
[1984] show that an increase in managerial ownership reduces the probability
of resistance to a takeover. This is, for instance, consistent with the
18
prediction in the model that high managerial ownership is positively
correlated with high golden parachutes.
Malatesta and Walking [1986] show that firms with a poor performance have
higher levels of poison pills. It is also known that poorly performing
managers oppose more resistance to takeovers (Smiley [1973], Kummer and
Hoffmeister [19781). Last, in the context of turnovers rather than takeovers,
Weisbach [1988] shows that a poor performance raises the probability of
turnover (although this probability remains small).
Brickley et. al [1985] and Tehranian and Waegelian [1985] show that stock
prices rise on announcements of introduction of performance-based incentive
schemes (in the context of our model, this corresponds to the principal's
welfare increasing when the manager signals he is good by taking large stock
options).
All these empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical view
presented above.
5. Extensions of the theory.
* Non-monetary investment. In section 3, we gave a reinterpretation of the
model in which investment is non-monetary. The manager exerts an effort to
pick the right investment. More effort today means a higher cost reduction
tomorrow. But it does not reduce today's cost. We call this a disembodied
cost reduction. In contrast, suppose that the very process of reducing
tomorrow's cost also reduces today's cost. For instance, the manager may find
tricks today that save money both today and tomorrow. We call this type of
effort embodied cost reduction or learning by doing. [Mathematically, the
first-period cost is C 1 = 3:-el and the second-period cost C 2
3-e2-g(e1)+¢2.]
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Encouraging first-period investment is even more important under
learning-by-doing. Not only does the incumbent's investment exert a positive
externality on the second source (as it did in section 3), but it also exerts
a positive externality on the principal: Because K1 is less than 1, some of
the incumbent's first-period cost reductions benefit the principal. Learning
by doing reinforces our conclusions on switching incentives. In particular,
the principal should favor the incumbent at the reprocurement stage. The
conclusion on performance-related incentives may be altered. In particular,
first period incentives become so important that the intertemporal structure
of incentives may be tilted the opposite way relative to Fact 2 (K1 > K2).
* Non-transferable investment. When investment cannot be transferred to a
second source (as seems to have been the case in the "great engine war," in
which the second source, General Electric, nearly eliminated the incumbent
Pratt and Whitney out of competition), the positive externality on the second
source disappears. A new -- and fairly subtle -- effect appears, that says
that at equal ex-post efficiencies (once the difference in efficiency due to
the non-transferable part of investment is taken account of), the second
source is ex-ante (pre-investment) more efficient. In case the distributions
of the types of the two agents are ex-ante identical, it can be shown that
everything is as if the second-sourcing were regulated under a lower asymmetry
of information and therefore should be favored at the reprocurement stage.
* Observable investment. We assumed all along that the incumbent's
investment is unobservable. In the procurement context, it would suffice that
it be not verifiable by a court. That is, even if outsiders can assess the
extent or quality of the investment, no rigorous measure of it can be provided
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as evidence in court. In the corporate context, unobservability, and not only
non-verifiability, is crucial. For, an investment that is observable by the
market makes its way into the stock valuation of the firm even if it is not
verifiable by a court. Thus, a manager who owns stock options has an
incentive to choose those projects with positive net present value. [If the
realized quality of the investment is observable just after the investment is
picked, but the effort to raise this quality is not, then the effort exerted
to increase the quality of this investment is formally identical to the effort
to reduce first-period cost in section 3, as the stocks react immediately to
the investment.]
An interesting question is whether the incumbent has an incentive to
distort the degree of non-transferability of his investments if he can do so.
If investment is not observable, he has no incentive to distort
transferability. If investment is observable by the market, however, it may
be in the incumbent's interest to make investments non-transferable, even if
it is costly to do, because this increases the probability that the incumbent
later keeps his informational rent (is not replaced). This may explain why




Baron, D. and Besanko 1984] "Regulation and Information in a Continuing
Relationship," Information, Economics and Policy, 1, 267-302.
Baron, D. and D. Besanko [1988] "Monitoring of Performance in Organizational
Contracting," forthcoming in Scandanavian Journal of Economics.
Brickley, J., S. Bhagat and R. Lease [1985) "The Impact of Long-Range
Managerial Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth," Journal of
Accounting and Research, 7, 115-130.
Demsetz, H. [1968] "Why Regulate Utilities?" Journal of Law and Economics, 11,
55-66.
Jensen, M. and K.J. Murphy [1987] "Are Executive Contracts Structured
Properly?" imeo, Harvard Business School.
Kummer, D. and J. Hoffmeister 1978] "Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender
Offers," Journal of Finance, 33, 505-516.
Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole [1986] "Using Cost Observation to Regulate
Firms," Journal of Political Economy, 94, 614-641.
Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole [1987a] "Repeated Auctions of Incentive
Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity, with an Application to
Takeovers," MIT DP 463.
Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole 1987b] "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal
of Political Economy, 95, 921-937.
Malatesta, P. and R. Walking [1986] "Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder
Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership Structure," imeo, University of
Washington and Ohio State University.
McAfee, P. and J. cMillan [1987] "Competition for Agency Contracts," Rand
Journal of Economics, 18, 296-307.
Mork, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny [1987] "Characteristics of Hostile and
Friendly Takeover Targets," Mimeo, University of Chicago Graduate School
of Business.
Mork, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny [1988] "Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis," forthcoming in Journal of Financial
Economics.
Posner, R. [1972] "The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television
Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, 3, 98-129.
Shleifer, A. and L. Summers [1987] "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers,"
NBER WP 2342.
Smiley, R. [1973] The Economics of Tender Offers, Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford
University.
22
Stigier, G. [1968] The Organization of Industry, Homewood, IL: Richard D.
Irwin.
Tehranian, H. and J. Waegelian [1985] "Market Reaction to Short-Term Executive
Compensation Plan Adoption," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7,
131-144.
Walking, R. and M. Long [1984] "Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and
Takeover Bid Resistance," Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 54-68.
Weisbach, M. 1988] "Outside Directors and CEO Turnovers," forthcoming in
Journal of Financial Economics.
Williamson, 0. [1976] "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General
and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, 7, 73-104.
Zupan, M. [1987] "Cable Franchise Renewals: Do Incumbent Firms Behave
Opportunistically?" Mimeo, USC School of Business.
